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Abstract
We analyze a mutual ¯re insurance mechanism used in Andorra,
which is called La Crema in the local language. This mechanism relies
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cation reachable through the mechanism requires that all households
honestly report the true value of their property. However, such hon-
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1 Introduction
Mutual insurance companies write large proportions of insurance policies in
many sectors.1 They have been very successful for several reasons. First,
as Malinvaud (1973) points out, future markets provide only a remote ide-
alization to the actual mechanism for risk allocation since \the ideal market
system is too costly to implement." On the contrary, pooling individual risk
by means of mutual insurance policies \permits substantial economizing on
market transactions" (Cass, Chichilnisky and Wu, 1996). Another important
reason for the success of mutual insurance is that they can solve through peer
monitoring some moral hazard problems that plague incorporated insurance
companies.2 3 While these problems are well understood, mutual insurance
arrangements also solve other informational problems relating to the discov-
ery of the value of insured property, as we show here.
In this paper we present and analyze a real-life mutual ¯re insurance
mechanism that has been functioning in a rural mountainous area of Western
Europe for well over a century and a half. In this mechanism, called La
Crema in the local language, each participating household must report a
value. In case there is a ¯re, the owner of the burned household receives
her reported value, which is paid by all participating households (including
herself) in proportion to their reported values. We focus on the rules of
La Crema because they are particularly clear from a game-theoretic point
of view, they are by no means exceptional, and the mechanism has some
remarkable properties.4
In particular, the properties of the La Crema mechanism that we explore
concern its e±ciency characteristics and the incentives it provides for truth-
ful reporting of property values. One important characteristic is that the
1\Advance premium mutuals write almost 40 percent of the life insurance in force and
almost 23 percent of the property and liability insurance premiums." (Williams, Smith
and Young, 1998).
2\Mutuals seem to have been more e®ective than stock companies in constructing such
incentive systems, particularly in the early phases of their history. Individual industrialists
were sometimes large enough to make investment in research on ¯re prevention worthwhile,
but stock companies discouraged the provision of public goods by appropriating too much
of the saving from decreased ¯re losses" (Heiner, 1985).
3Obviously, mutuals have problems of their own, or they would be the only organiza-
tional form. \From a ¯nancial perspective, the key impediment to mutual life company
stability, growth and development, is that equity capital can be raised only through re-
tained earnings from the company's operations," (Garber, 1993). Also, mutuals are very
di±cult to take over, which makes the corporate governance problem harder to solve,
especially in large mutuals.
4A similar proportion rule is adopted, for instance, in marine insurance clubs: \At the
beginning of the year the shipowners are given an estimate of the amount (call) they will
be required to pay into the [Protection and Indemnity] Club. However, the eventual call is
dependent upon the claim made by all members: each member knows only the proportion
[emphasis in the original] of the total cost they will be required to bear." (Bennett, 2000).
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mechanism allows for announcement of any value by households and does
not seek any appraisal or cross-report by any witnesses. This is potentially a
nice feature because it could allow the mechanism to insure the \subjective"
value of property (as a welfarist would like), rather than the appraisable mar-
ket value. The subjective value can include sentimental factors which could
not be valued appropriately by the market. This additional feature of the
mechanism will only be useful if the mechanism provides incentives to (ap-
proximately) announce truthfully and provides for e±cient risk sharing. We
will see that, under appropriate conditions, the mechanism performs these
tasks quite well, and without having to resort to audits or other forms of \in-
dependent" assessments. Let us now discuss the mechanism's performance
in more detail.
With regards to e±ciency, the mechanism places strong constraints on the
possible risk sharing that can take place since reimbursements and payments
are both scaled directly in terms of the announced property values. For
instance, if households have constant (and identical) relative risk aversion, the
only Pareto e±cient allocation that is reachable through the game requires
that all households truthfully report the value of their property. Things are
even worse with constant (and identical) absolute risk aversion as then no
Pareto e±cient allocation is obtainable as an outcome in the game regardless
of how the announcements are varied.5
With regards to the incentives that the mechanism provides for truthful
reporting of property values, we show that there is an equilibrium where all
households report the true value of their insured property if and only if these
valuations are exactly the same across households. Apart from this extreme
case of identical property values, we show that households with relatively
high property values have an incentive to overreport their value (to increase
reimbursement from others when needed) and households with low property
values have an incentive to underreport their value (to decrease payment to
others when asked for).
The analysis described above appears to be in con°ict with the conven-
tional wisdom among the actual participants in the game, who are happy
with the functioning of the mechanism and consider that the only natural
thing one can do is to report the true value of the property. Since the mech-
anism has existed for a long time one would think that tradition or their own
experience could furnish enough information for agents to know their best
response. In fact, the incentive and e±ciency properties that the mechanism
exhibits are quite appealing and closely in line with local wisdom once we
examine large enough societies and consider approximate rather than exact
e±ciency.
From the perspective of larger societies, we ¯rst show that households
5As one would expect, by the nature of the mechanism, where only property values are
reported, di®erences in risk aversion do not seem to be the answer either.
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in large enough societies have arbitrarily small incentives to deviate from
honest reporting, or in other words, truth is an "-Nash equilibrium. Second,
we show that in large enough societies, the (exact) Nash equilibria of the
La Crema mechanism involve reports that are arbitrarily close to the truth.6
Third, the Nash equilibria (and "-Nash equilibria) are arbitrarily close to
being Pareto e±cient in large enough societies. Finally, we show that for
reasonable parameterizations of utility functions what is needed in the above
statements in terms of \large enough" societies, can actually be reasonably
small. Moreover, these results are robust to variations in the informational
structure as they hold both with complete and with private information.
The interest of this institution is manifold, and quite di®erent from other
studies of risk sharing institutions.7 First of all, the La Crema institution
refers to a specialized type of risk, which limits the potential explanations for
observed behavior. Secondly, the transfer rules are quite explicit and regu-
lated. Finally, the rural society under consideration is relatively rich during
the whole period of the mechanism's operation (for example, there are no in-
stances of famines during its existence). The remainder of the paper proceeds
as follows. Section 2 describes the mechanism (informally and formally) and
gives some background on the society where the institution operates. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the equilibrium and e±ciency properties of the mechanism.
Section 4 provides results characterizing the equilibria and approximate e±-
ciency of the mechanism in \large" societies. Section 5 concludes.
2 La Crema
2.1 The institution of La Crema
In 1882, and under the initiative of the local priest, the 102 farms of Canillo
in Principality of Andorra8 organized themselves into a ¯re insurance cooper-
6One should note, of course, that while the larger scale of society may solve the re-
porting problem of La Crema, it may create other problems, as providing adequate ¯re
prevention can become now a worse public good problem. \Today's P&I [Protection and
Indemnity] Clubs are global in scale, with the largest containing over 20% of the world's
oceangoing °eet. Communal responsibility may be unrealistic in such large-scale institu-
tions because free rider problems become more di±cult to monitor and control as group
size and dispersion increase." (Bennett, 2000).
7Such as the ones mentioned in McCloskey (1989), Townsend (1993) or Fafchamps
(1999). Besley, Coate and Loury (1993, 1994) examine the allocative performance of a
simple, easily organized and widely observed institution for ¯nancial intermediation called
rosca (rotating savings and credit associations).
8The Principality of Andorra, located in the heart of the Pyrenees between France and
Spain, is both one of the smallest and the oldest states in Western Europe: the national
territory is 468 km2 and today's frontiers were de¯nitely settled in 1278. The country
is divided administratively into seven parishes: Canillo, Ordino, La Massana, Encamp,
Andorra la Vella, Sant Juliµa de Lµoria and Escaldes-Engordany. Agriculture has been the
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ative named La Crema. By that time, Andorra was mostly a rural area living
in quasi-autarchy, and La Crema was conceived as a risk-sharing institution
to cope with ¯re damages that were a source of major worries to farmers in
mountainous Canillo where sinuous and steep roads did not allow for quick
nor e®ective ¯re brigades. Since its early beginnings, the role of La Crema
was twofold: as a logistic structure, to organize the local ¯reman forces; as a
¯nancial structure, to guarantee pecuniary compensations to farms su®ering
¯re destructions.9
The organization of La Crema is as follows. Once a year, the cooperative
members meet in a general assembly, the consell de La Crema (La Crema
council). The meeting is ¯xed on the Sunday that falls two weeks before the
carnival and attendance is compulsory for all members.10 The meeting is
supervised by two permanent secretaris (secretaries) who are elected for life.
During this general assembly, each farmer announces a value for each of the
building that he or she owns (farm, barn, cow-shed, stable, etc.). Conven-
tional wisdom suggests that farmers report the true and total value of their
property, and La Crema cooperative members typically do so. This amount
is noted in three di®erent books: each secretari keeps a copy at home and a
third book is stored at the parish town-hall.11 In the case of a ¯re, the owner
of the damaged building receives a compensation equal at most to the value
noted in the book for the current year, depending on the extent of the dam-
ages. This ¯nancial compensation is made by the other cooperative members,
who pay in proportion to the share their own announced property value rep-
resents with respect to the total of all values announced by the La Crema
members. An early reference and brief description of the La Crema transfer
rule can also be found in Brutails (1904): \Comme dans toute les popula-
tions aux prises avec une nature ingrate, la solidarit¶e est d¶evelopp¶ee parmi
les Andorrans; elle a donn¶e naissance µa des soci¶et¶es d'assurances mutuelles
contre l'incendie. Les soci¶et¶es d'assurances sont g¶en¶eralement ouvertes aux
habitants d'un village; les associ¶es peuvent refuser d'admettre au b¶en¶e¯ce
de l'assurance les immeubles dont les risques d¶epassent la moyenne. En cas
de sinistre, chacun paie, pour indemniser le propri¶etaire, au prorata de la
somme pour laquelle lui-me^me est assur¶e" (p. 42).12
major economic activity of Andorra until the end of the 19th century; tourism, commerce
and ¯nancial services are now the basic national economic activities. In 1999, the GDP
per capita was 20,252 $. See http://www.turisme.ad/angles/index.htm for more details.
9La Crema is still active and intervened recently to ¯nancially compensate Cal Soldevila
whose barn partially burned in August of 1998 and Cal Batista for similar damages in July
of 1985.
10An absent member without a good excuse is ¯ned. The last ¯ne dates back to 1946.
11We are indebted to one secretari, Josep Torres Babot (Cal Jep), and to the Canillo
public librarian Ma Dolors Calv¶o Casal (Cal Soldevila) for their invaluable help in provid-
ing thorough information about La Crema during long conversations.
12\As it is often the case with societies living in inhospitable areas, solidarity is highly
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During the yearly meeting, four comissionats (commissioners) and three
recaudadors (money-collectors) are elected for one year. The comissionats
are responsible for the logistic and technical activities. First, they guarantee
that all cooperative members take the appropriate precautionary measures
to prevent possible ¯res by reporting to the consell de La Crema carelessness
in farm and building maintenance and to report any problematic behavior.
Second, they are in charge of the ¯re ¯ghting material owned by the co-
operative (¯re-hoses, etc.). Finally, in case of ¯re, the comissionats ¯x, in
accordance with the concerned farmer, the total value of the damages to be
reimbursed (depending on the extent of the damages and not exceeding the
value noted in the book) and submit it to the consell for approval. The three
elected recaudadors represent each a di®erent geographical area: Canillo, la
Ribera and Prats.13 In case of ¯re, and once the amount to be transferred to
the damaged farm is ¯xed by the consell under proposition of the comission-
ats, the recaudadors are responsible for collecting the contributions of the La
Crema members within their area of intervention.
In the formal game theoretic analysis we are going to focus on the incen-
tives to report truthfully the value of the property. As we mention in the
introduction, the relevant valuation here is the individual subjective value,
which may be very di®erent from the market valuation. Because of this,
there is quite a lot of freedom in the mechanism for reporting valuations.
Unfortunately, this implies that there may be incentives to over-insure your
property and then burn it. If players can commit arson (and not be caught),
that would completely destroy any possibilities for any insurance (La Crema
or otherwise), which is why commercial ¯rms typically disallow insuring a
property above its market price. Deterrents to arson are twofold: as for
other insurance arrangements, there is a chance of being caught and su®er
severe penalties (long prison terms). But La Crema, as other mutual insur-
ance arrangements, also adds another dimension that a commercial or market
based insurance scheme would not: given that each household is insured by
their neighbors, the neighbors have an added incentive to monitor the be-
havior of a given household to make sure that they abide by the ¯re codes
(and do not commit arson!).
developed among the Andorrans, and has given rise in particular to mutual ¯re-insurance
associations. Inhabitants of a same village can usually all become insurance society fellows.
Nonetheless, buildings o®ering ¯re-risks above average may be denied insurance coverage.
In case of damage, all fellows pay to compensate the owner for her loss, and they do so in
proportion to the value for which they are themselves insured."
13The ¯rst region, Canillo, corresponds to the main town with the same name. The
second region, la Ribera, includes the following villages: Els Plans, Els Vilars, El Tarter,
L'Aldosa, L'Armiana, Ransol and Soldeu. Finally, the last region, Prats, includes: El
Forn, Meritxell, Molleres and Prats.
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2.2 The La Crema game
There is a set N of households, with jN j = n. Each household has a utility
function ui and a wealth wi 2 [c; C] where C ¸ c > 0. Let W = Pi2N wi.14
We take each ui to be twice continuously di®erentiable and strictly concave.
Let S = 2N be the set of possible states. In particular, s 2 S is a list of
farms that burned. For instance, s = f2; 7; 12g denotes that farms 2, 7 and
12 (and only those farms) burned. Let S(k) = fs j #s = kg be the set of
states where exactly k farms burn. Note that S = [nk=0S(k). For any i 2 N ,
let Si denote the set of states for which farm i burns (perhaps along with
some other farms), and S
(k)
i be the set of states for which k farms in addition
to farm i burn. Let ps be the probability of state s. We assume that all states
where an identical number k of farms burn are equally likely. That is, for all
s; s0 2 S(k), ps = ps0 and we denote this probability by pk.15 A special case of
this is where each farm burns with an independent and identical probability.
Note, however, that it is not required that the burnings be independent. As
an extreme example, it could be that p0 > 0 and pn > 0 and pk = 0 for all
other k. This might be an example where all the farms lie close to each other
in a forest, so that either all farms burn or none burns. All we assume is that
pk > 0 for some k > 0, so that there is some chance of a ¯re.
We now describe formally the rules of the La Crema game. Each house-
hold sends a message mi 2 [0; 2C] ; to the coordinator, which is interpreted
to be an announcement of their (subjective) property value at risk.16 Let
m = (m1; : : : ;mn) 2 [0; 2C]n be a vector of messages. LetM = Pi2N mi and
for all s 2 S, let Ms = Pi2Nnsmi. The allocation rule used by the coordina-
tor is the following: in state s 2 S, household i 2 s receives miMsM ; whereas
each household j 2 Nns receives wj ¡mj (M¡Ms)M : One can easily check thatP
j2Nnsmj
(M¡Ms)
M
=
P
i2smi
Ms
M
, namely that the sum of the contributions
by households j 2 Nns whose farms did not burn is equal to the sum that
households i 2 s receive as a compensation for their losses. Note that if
announcements are truthful (mi = wi), then in each state s the undamaged
property is e®ectively distributed among all households in proportion to their
wealths (so the ¯nal allocations are Ws
wi
W
).
14We treat wealth as the property that may potentially burn. Utility functions may, of
course, be normalized so that this is without loss of generality.
15This condition is important in the approximate e±ciency and equilibrium results we
obtain. If this condition does not hold, so that there are some asymmetries in relative
probabilities of di®erent farms burning, then one could form sub-groups for insurance,
where farms with similar probabilities were grouped together. This will become clear in
the proofs of the propositions and in some discussion below.
16The upper bound on announcements is arbitrarily set at twice the highest imaginable
property value. Any upper bound would do.
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3 Discussion of the game
3.1 Equilibria
The ¯rst proposition says that truthful announcements are a Nash equilib-
rium only in the case where all wealths are identical.
Proposition 1 The La Crema game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies where mi = wi for all i 2 N if and only if wi = wj, 8i; j 2 N .
The proof of Proposition 1 appears in the appendix. The intuition be-
hind the Proposition is roughly as follows. Increasing mi has two e®ects.
First, it increases the reimbursement that household i receives in the case
of a ¯re that consumes i's property. Second, it increases the liability that i
faces in the event that some other household's property burns. Some heuris-
tic calculations help illustrate the relative size of these two e®ects and the
incentives that households have as a result. For simplicity, consider a sit-
uation where at most one household will have a ¯re, and so we need only
consider states of the form fig, where i's property is destroyed.17 Consider
what happens if i raises mi by some small amount " > 0. This increases
i's reimbursement by (approximately) "Mi
M
if the state is fig (where recall
that Mi =
P
j 6=imj and M =
P
jmj). It also increases the payments that i
has to make to household j 6= i in state fjg by mj "M . Note that summing
across states, these cancel each other out. That is, "Mi
M
=
P
j 6=imj
"
M
. So,
by lowering the announcement mi, household i transfers wealth from state
fig to the other states fjg, j 6= i; and vice versa from raising the announce-
ment. So what are the households' incentives in the game? Given their risk
aversion, they wish to come as close as possible to smoothing their wealth
across the states. If all households have exactly the same wealth, then at a
truthful announcement in the La Crema game household i gets ¯nal wealth
wi
Ws
W
in state s, and given the equal starting wealths is equal across each
state s = fkg. Thus, the households' wealths are evenly spread across these
states and they have no incentives to change their announcements. Next,
consider the case where households do not have the same wealth. Order
them so that wn ¸ wn¡1 ¢ ¢ ¢w1, and wn > w1. Then notice that farmer 1
consumes the highest amount in the state where her property burns w1
W1
W
,
versus w1
Wj
W
in some state j 6= 1, since W1 ¸ W2 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¸ Wn. By lowering
m1 a little, household 1 decreases consumption in the state f1g where farm
1 burns, and distributes a commensurate increase among other states fjg,
17The state where no farm burns has no impact since no payments are made. States
where several farms burn have analogous calculations as those discussed here, as the
consideration is what happens if i's farm burns versus some other farm burns (on the
margin).
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where farm j 6= 1 burns. As households are risk averse, this strictly bene¯ts
household 1. Conversely, farmer n consumes less in the state where farm
n burns compared to states where some other farm burns. By raising mn,
farmer n shifts wealth from states fjg, j 6= n, to state fng. Roughly, house-
holds with below average property value will bene¯t from underreporting,
and those with above average property value will bene¯t from overreporting.
The proposition tells us that the game does not have an equilibrium where
households report the true value of their property if there is any heterogeneity
in household value. The case of heterogeneity is arguably the interesting case,
as it would be hard to see the reason for an elaborate mechanism (which
is not costless to administer) unless there were some kind of heterogeneity.
Otherwise, there would be common knowledge precisely about the thing that
the coordinator is trying to elucidate.
This result still holds when there is private information about property
values. All that is needed (this is clear from the proof as well as in the
intuition above) is for some households to be fairly sure that they have the
top or bottom property value (or that they are close to either).
The following remark shows that the problem goes even further. When
there are only two households, there is no interior pure-strategy equilibrium
to the game at all. Either both households refuse to participate (there is
always such a degenerate equilibrium where neither household declares any
wealth given the expectation that the other will not), or the wealthier house-
hold has such a strong incentive to overreport that they report the maximum
allowed property value.
Remark 1 Let n = 2. If w1
³
1 + w2
4C
´
< w2 (a su±cient condition for which
is w1 <
3
4
w2), then the only pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the La Crema
game are (m1;m2) = (0; 0) and (m1;m2) = (
2w1C
4C+w1
; 2C).
It is hard to see what an insurance mechanism is trying to accomplish if
it leads to such extreme outcomes.
Before providing an answer to this paradox, let us examine the Pareto
e±ciency characteristics of the La Crema game.
3.2 E±ciency
Let Ws =
P
i2N wi ¡
P
i2swi. Thus, Ws is the total wealth in the society
given that s is the state. Let a risk-sharing allocation be any random vector
x = (x1; : : : ; xn) such that
P
i2N xi(s) = Ws in each state s. Thus, a risk-
sharing allocation is some distribution of the wealth in the society. Note
that this includes risk-sharing schemes that are not available as outcomes of
the La Crema game. Let Eui(x) denote the expected utility of i 2 N under
the risk-sharing allocation x. Let xm denote the risk-sharing allocation that
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comes from announcements m in the La Crema game. And let xw denote the
risk-sharing allocation that comes from truthful announcements (mi = wi)
in the La Crema game.
We begin with e±ciency results for the special case where households
have identical constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions (i.e.,
ui(ci) = c
°
i =° with ° 6= 1). We show that even in this special case the
only Pareto e±cient18 allocations that can be reached as outcomes of the
La Crema game arise from reporting the true value of one's household. The
reason is that equality of marginal rates of substitution across states of the
world requires that ratios of consumption are equalized for all states of the
world. This can only happen when households report the true value of the
property.
Proposition 2 If households have identical CRRA utility functions and there
exist i; j 2 N such that wi 6= wj, then there is a unique Pareto e±cient risk-
sharing allocation that is reachable through the La Crema game. It is to have
each household report truthfully (so xwi (s) = wi
Ws
W
; 8i 2 N; 8s 2 S).
We note that Propositions 1 and 2 imply that the only Pareto e±cient
outcome of the La Crema game (under identical constant relative risk aver-
sion) cannot be sustained as a Nash equilibrium.
Given that (Arrow-Debreu complete market) Walrasian outcomes are ef-
¯cient, an interesting question in this context is whether the unique Pareto
e±cient outcome reachable through the La Crema game (when households
have identical CRRA utility functions) corresponds to the Arrow- Debreu
complete market Walrasian equilibrium of this economy when the endow-
ments for the household i are wi in state s =2 Si and 0 in states Si: The
following proposition shows that this is generically not the case.
Remark 2 Let the probability of any farm burning be given by p > 0 and
have this probability be independent across farms. If there exist k and j such
that wk 6= wj, then the unique Pareto e±cient allocation reachable through
the La Crema game when the players have identical CRRA utility functions,
is di®erent from the outcome of the complete market Walrasian equilibrium
of the La Crema economy.
The next proposition shows that if agents have CARA utility functions,
then di±culties in reaching e±ciency are even worse for the La Crema game in
that all of the allocations that are reachable through the game are ine±cient.
The reason is that Pareto optimality with identical CARA utility functions
18Pareto e±ciency is, of course, relative to the expected utilities for an allocation. So
expectations are taken before the state is realized and so households do not know which
property has been destroyed.
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requires that di®erences in utilities across states of the world are equalized
across agents. This demands on the one hand that reports are the same for
all agents, and at the same time that they are truthful. With heterogeneous
endowments the two requirements are not compatible.
Proposition 3 If for some i; j 2 N , wi 6= wj and households have identical
CARA utility functions, then there is no Pareto e±cient allocation that can
be reached through the La Crema game.
The following remark shows that di®erences in risk attitudes across house-
holds will not help to explain the ine±ciency of the La Crema game. This
is evident when the probability of no property burning is di®erent from zero
(p0 > 0), because in that case Pareto e±ciency requires transfers from the
relatively more risk averse agents to the relatively less risk averse agents when
no property burns (i.e., in state s 2 S(0)), and La Crema speci¯es no trans-
fers for s 2 S(0). The remark shows that even if there were some household
burning in all states of the world (p0 = 0), there would still be no Pareto
e±cient outcome of the game.
Remark 3 Assume that n ¸ 3, that household i = 1 is risk neutral, the
other households have (possibly heterogeneous) CRRA utility functions, and
for some i; j 2 N , wi 6= wj, then there is no Pareto e±cient allocation that
is obtainable through the La Crema game.
The above results leave us with a puzzle that needs to be explained.
Pareto e±ciency can only be obtained through the La Crema game in some
extreme cases, and even then the corresponding allocation cannot be sus-
tained as an equilibrium of this game as long as there is any heterogeneity
in household property values. So why would the La Crema game be used?
An analysis of larger societies provides an answer.
4 Larger Societies
While Proposition 1 shows that truth is only a Nash equilibrium in extreme
(and implausible) situations, the La Crema game still has very nice features
in terms of its equilibrium structure and e±ciency characteristics. We point
these out in a series of propositions. First, we show that truth is an "-Nash
equilibrium for large enough societies. Thus, the gains from over or under-
stating one's wealth are not large. While this suggests that the La Crema
game will have nice properties, it is not completely convincing since it does
not guarantee that the exact Nash equilibria will be close to truthful. Second,
we show that there always exist (non-degenerate) Nash equilibria. Third, we
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show that all non-degenerate Nash equilibria are close to truthful in large so-
cieties. Thus, the La Crema game provides incentives for individuals to play
(approximately) truthfully. Finally, we show that truth and all announce-
ments close to truth are approximately Pareto e±cient (with arbitrary utility
functions). Taken together these results show that the Nash equilibria and
"-Nash equilibria of the La Crema game are approximately e±cient in large
societies with arbitrary heterogeneity in preferences and endowments.
In order to talk about large societies and approximation, we consider the
following setting. Let n1; n2; n3; : : : an increasing sequence of integers such
that nh !1. Each h 2 IN de¯nes a La Crema game with population Nh of
size nh.
In addition, we maintain the following assumption on preferences in what
follows. For all i 2 Nh and for all h 2 IN:
(A1) For any ¹ > 0 there exists ± > 0 such that if jw ¡ wij < ± then
ju0i (w)¡ u0i (wi)j < ¹.
(A1) implies that the second derivative of utility functions has some
bound that applies to all players and games.19 In other words, players are
not arbitrarily risk averse. Note that no particular form is assumed for the
utility functions ui ¡ so they can di®er across people as long as there is an
upper bound on how risk averse people are.
4.1 Approximate Equilibria
Proposition 4 For any " > 0 there exists an integer H such that for any
h > H, it is an "¡Nash equilibrium of the La Crema game for all people in
Nh to report truthfully (mi = wi).
The proof of Proposition 4 appears in the appendix. To get a feeling for
the intuition, let us do the following exercise. Changes of a given mi have
relatively little impact on M =
P
imi in a large society, so let us treat M
as ¯xed ¡ as the e®ects on it are second order (these e®ects are carefully
handled in the appendix). Consider a scenario where one farm burns, but
we are not sure which. So, the conditional expectation is 1=n on each farm.
What happens if household i increases mi by one unit? The gain is roughly
1
n
P
j 6=i
mj
M
u0i(mi ¡m2i =M), in the case where it is i's farm that burns. The
loss is 1
n
P
j 6=i
1
M
mju
0
i(wi ¡ mimj=M) as we sum over the cases where each
other farm burns ¡ as i is liable for an extra 1=M of each value mj. Since
in a large society mi=M ¼ 0, these approximately cancel at mi = wi, and so
i does not gain much by changing mi. So, under the La Crema game, the
19Note that this assumption trivially holds in the CRRA case as long as the ° is bounded
from above.
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expected cost (in utils) of the insurance is approximately
P
j 6=imj=Mu0i(wi),
and it pays o® approximately
P
j 6=imj=Mu0i(mi).
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Another way to view this, is to go back to the intuition discussed af-
ter Proposition 1. Lowering household i's announcement e®ectively transfers
wealth from states where i's property burns to states where some other prop-
erty burns in i's place. The relative di®erence in i's wealth across these states
under truthful reporting is negligible to begin with: wi
Ws
W
is almost the same
as wi
Ws0
W
, if s is a state where i burns and s0 is a corresponding state where
some other farm burns in i's place; as Ws
W
is almost the same as Ws0
W
in a large
society.
The above intuition shows that La Crema is a subtle institution since the
cost of insurance depends on u0i(wi) and its payo® depends on u
0
i(mi) ¡ and
most importantly in a way that gives agents just the right incentives (in large
economies where M is approximately una®ected by i's announcement).
Let us stress an important feature of the result in Proposition 4. The
bounds we use in the proof are robust to the information structure and the
actions of the other agents. That is, they do not depend on the pk's, what the
wj's are for j 6= i, and work uniformly across i's so long as (A1) is satis¯ed.21
In fact, all that is needed is that a household believes that their property
value will be a relatively small amount of the total announced property value
to have truth be nearly a best response. This robustness is important not
just for realism's sake. In an environment with complete information there
are formal mechanisms which implement \exactly" the e±cient outcome, but
this is not the case with incomplete information.
Example 1: There is a population of 100 households who each have the
same preferences, ui(ci) =
p
ci. The households di®er in the value of their
properties: half are of a \low" type with wL = 10000 and the other half are
of a \high" type with wH = 30000. Let the probability that a ¯re burns a
given property be 1/100, and be such that exactly one house burns.22 This
allows for easy calculations, and is not much di®erent from the i.i.d. case in
terms of incentives and expected utilities. In this case, if other households
20When we have more than two farms burning at a time, the argument becomes a bit
more complicated, but we can still match up positive and negative terms. The marginal
utilities withmi¡m2i =M and wi¡mimj=M are replaced respectively by marginal utilities
of something like mi¡mi(mi+Ms)=M and wi¡mi(mj+Ms)=M: Again, sincemi=M ¼ 0,
these terms equalize approximately when wi =mi:
21The proof uses the fact that ps's are equal across s's of the same size. We are not
sure how the mechanism performs if there are drastic disparities in the probability of ¯res
across properties. Regardless, La Crema could be made to work in such cases by separating
properties into relatively homogeneous risk categories operating the mechanism separately
over di®erent risk categories, especially as much of the bene¯ts can still be realized with
relatively small numbers.
22So, p1 =
1
100 and pk = 0 for k 6= 1, where recall that pk is the probability of each state
where exactly k farms burn.
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Table 1: ui(ci) = c
:5
i
EUi EUi EUi Gain Best
Autar. Truth B.R. B.R. Response
n=2 99.000 99.370 99.420 .050 6000
n=4 99.000 99.452 99.459 .007 7992
n=100 99.000 99.500 99.500 10¡5 9925
Table 2: ui(ci) = c
:9
i
EUi EUi EUi Gain Best
Autar. Truth B.R. B.R. Response
n=2 3941.3 3943.5 3944.1 .6 6000
n=4 3941.3 3944.5 3944.6 .1 8002
n=100 3941.3 3945.2 3945.2 10¡3 9925
are reporting truthfully, then a low type's best response is approximately
mi = 9925, and the gain in expected utility of announcing 9925 compared
to 10000 is approximately 10¡5 out of an expected utility of approximately
99.5, which is a gain of about only 10¡5%. To put this in perspective, not
participating leads to an expected utility of 99, and so the overall bene¯t
of participating in La Crema is about .5. Thus, the gain of an optimal
deviation from truth is very small even compared to the overall bene¯t from
participation (10¡5=:5). Similar calculations for the high type lead to a best
response (to truth by the others) of mi = 30077 and a similar sized gain (on
the order of 10¡5) compared to truthful announcing.
Table 1 summarizes the results with these parameters for di®erent popu-
lation sizes.
The results for ui(ci) = c
:9
i and ui(ci) = c
:1
i are given in tables 2 and 3
respectively. For more risk averse ui than the ones we give, the di®erences
between truth and best response are even smaller, and notice that the usual
estimated values for the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion parameter23 are between
¡1 and ¡4.
23See Szpiro (1986), Barsky et al. (1997) or Chou, Engle and Kane (1992) and references
therein.
Table 3: ui(ci) = c
:1
i
EUi EUi EUi Gain Best
Autar. Truth B.R. B.R. Response
n=2 2.4904 2.5080 2.5085 .0005 6000
n=4 2.4904 2.5090 2.5089 .0001 7982
n=100 2.4904 2.5094 2.5094 { 9925
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4.2 Equilibria
While Proposition 4 is somewhat reassuring that truthful reporting of prop-
erty values can reasonably be expected in the La Crema game, it leaves open
the possibility that the actual equilibrium could still be quite far from truth-
ful. (Note that generally "-Nash equilibria need not be near Nash equilibria.)
As we now show, however, the Nash equilibria of the La Crema game are in
fact close to being truthful.
Before we proceed, note that (0; : : : ; 0) is always an equilibrium of the
La Crema game. We call this the degenerate equilibrium. Say that an equi-
librium is non-degenerate if there is some player i who places probability
less than 1 on playing mi = 0. It can be shown that any strategy where
mi < wi=2 is weakly dominated, and so the only equilibria that do not in-
volve weakly dominated strategies must have mi ¸ wi=2 (as is shown in the
appendix following equation (8)24). In fact, the following propositions show
that non-degenerate equilibria exist and have some strong properties.
Proposition 5 There exists a non-degenerate Nash equilibrium of the La
Crema game. Moreover, there exists a strict Nash equilibrium (and thus in
pure and undominated strategies) where each player i plays mi ¸ wi2 such
that 4C
2
W
¸ jmi ¡ wij.
The proof of Proposition 5 uses the following Proposition, which estab-
lishes that all non-degenerate equilibria involve players playing within certain
bounds of wi.
Proposition 6 In any non-degenerate Nash equilibrium of the La Crema
game, all players only place probability on mi such that
4C
W
¸ j(mi ¡ wi) =wij :
Thus, 4C
2
W
¸ jmi ¡ wij and so as W becomes large jmi ¡ wij ! 0 uniformly
across i for any mi in the support of any sequence of non-degenerate Nash
equilibria.
The proof of proposition 6 follows similar intuition as that behind Propo-
sition 4. We know that the gain from misreporting is small in a large society,
and the proof uses the strict concavity of ui to show that grossly misreporting
cannot be a best response: if it involves gross underreporting then there are
substantial gains in insurance to be realized by increasing the report, and
24In fact, the only time mi = 0 is a best response is if all other players have mj = 0;
and as long there is at least one j who places at least some probability on mj > 0, then
mi = wi=2 strictly dominates any lower announcement.
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if it involves gross overreporting then there the household is overexposed in
their liability and they bene¯t from decreasing the report.
Propositions 4, 5, and 6 provide a resolution to the seeming con°ict be-
tween the observation that with heterogeneous societies truthful reporting
is not an equilibrium of the La Crema game, and the conventional wisdom
among the actual participants of the game who think that it is best to re-
port the true value of the property. These previous propositions establish
that there exist strict25 Nash equilibria that are non-degenerate and that
any non-degenerate equilibrium of the mechanism is \close" to truthful re-
porting, and gets closer the bigger the society.
4.3 Approximate E±ciency
While the above results resolve the incentive part of the paradox of the La
Crema game, the e±ciency characteristics are still somewhat puzzling, as
with in many cases fully Pareto e±cient allocations are not obtainable as an
outcome of the game, even under truthful reporting. As it turns out, however,
the allocation that results from truthful reporting is close to being e±cient
in large societies (even with heterogeneous preferences), and thus so are the
outcomes associated with non-degenerate equilibria. This is formalized as
follows.
Consider a sequence of economies Nh in the La Crema game satisfying
(A1). Normalize utility functions so that that ui(0) = 0 for each h and
i 2 Nh. Furthermore, suppose that there exists a > 0 and a > 0 such that
(A2) a > u0i(x) > a for all x 2 [0; 2C], h, and i 2 Nh.
Condition (A2) bounds the derivative of ui uniformly across i.
Proposition 7 Consider a sequence of economies Nh in the La Crema game
as described above (satisfying (A1) and (A2)). Let the probability of any farm
burning be given by p > 0 and have this probability be independent across
farms.
(i) If a sequence of risk-sharing allocations fxhg Pareto dominates fxw;hg
(the allocations associated with truthful reporting in La Crema game),
then P
i2Nh Eui(xh)¡ Eui(xw;h)P
i2Nh Eui(x
h
w)
! 0:
25Such equilibria are also in undominated strategies, and satisfy individual rationality
constraints. Note, in fact, that in the La Crema game, a player by announcing mi = 0
e®ectively does not participate, and so any equilibrium must satisfy an interim individual
rationality constraint, and here it is satis¯ed strictly.
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(ii) If a sequence of risk-sharing allocations fxhg Pareto dominates the al-
locations of the La Crema game associated with a non-degenerate Nash
equilibrium fxm;hg, thenP
i2Nh Eui(x
h)¡Eui(xm;h)P
i2Nh Eui(x
m;h)
! 0:
The proof of Proposition 7 uses a Law of Large Numbers to tie down
the expected property damage to the society. This means that the insurance
problem can be approximated by a situation where a given household has
a good idea of the cost of insurance and faces only its idiosyncratic risk
of loss of property. In such a situation, truthful announcements lead to
approximately e±cient outcomes, and so non-degenerate equilibria (which
are approximately truthful) are also approximately e±cient.
5 Conclusions
We have shown that true reporting leads to the unique Pareto e±cient out-
come of the La Crema game, but the corresponding allocation cannot be
sustained as an exact equilibrium of this game as long as there is some het-
erogeneity in household value. However, we have also shown that if the
society is large enough, true reporting is \almost" optimal, and that the
non-degenerate equilibria of the game lead to outcomes that are close to be-
ing Pareto e±cient. It is worth remarking that this e±cient solution has
been attained by a contractual mechanism which is also relatively simple.
Although the framework studied here is one with complete information
about the valuations, these results hold even with private information. Truth-
ful reporting is not an equilibrium as long as some agents know that they are
likely to have the highest or lowest wealth. But in a large society, deviations
will be small, if household believe that their property value will be a rela-
tively small amount of the total announced property value. This robustness
with respect to the information structure is important not just because it
is more realistic. With complete information there are formal mechanisms
which implement \exactly" the e±cient outcome, but this is not the case
with incomplete information.
Mutual institutions with proportional payment/reimbursement rules are,
as we discuss in the introduction, a large part of the insurance business. But
they occur in other markets. One is horseracing betting: winning tickets
earn back a fraction of total bets in proportion to how much one bets on the
winning horse. That is usually referred to as \pari-mutuel"-betting (Gabriel
and Marsden 1990, Gulley and Scott 1989). National lottery systems often
have this feature as well. This suggests that further exploring the mechanism
may be a worthwhile enterprise.
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As a ¯nal observation, we note that the outcome of the La Crema game
preserves the relative level of wealth for all households. This contrasts with
Young's (1998, p. 132) observation that \the most stable contractual ar-
rangements are those that are e±cient, and more or less egalitarian, given
the parties' payo® opportunities." An interesting question for future research
would be to explain why, of all the possible e±cient allocations, the actual
mechanism in use results in (something close to) one that preserves the wealth
ranking under this class of adverse contingencies.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Without loss of generality, assume that wn ¸
¢ ¢ ¢ ¸ w1. Household i's expected payo® is then:
Eui (m) =
nX
k=1
Eu
(k)
i (m) +
Ã
1¡
nX
k=1
pk
!
ui (wi)
where for all n ¸ k ¸ 1
Eu(k)i (m) = pk
264 X
s2S(k¡1)i
ui
µ
mi
Ms
M
¶
+
X
s02S(k)nS(k¡1)i
ui
µ
wi ¡miM ¡Ms0
M
¶375
is the expected utility of household i when k farms burn. Fix some n ¸ k ¸ 1.
Direct calculation gives:
@Eu
(k)
i
@mi
= pk
µ
1¡ mi
M
¶
¢(k)i (m)
where
¢
(k)
i (m) =
X
s2S(k¡1)i
µ
Ms
M
¶
u0i
µ
mi
Ms
M
¶
¡ X
s02S(k)nS(k¡1)i
M ¡Ms0
M
u0i
µ
wi ¡miM ¡Ms
0
M
¶
=
X
s2S(k¡1)i
X
j2Nns
mj
M
u0i
µ
mi
Ms
M
¶
¡ X
s02S(k)nS(k¡1)i
X
j2s0
mj
M
u0i
µ
wi ¡miM ¡Ms0
M
¶
We have
¯¯¯
S
(k¡1)
i
¯¯¯
=
³
n¡1
k¡1
´
and
¯¯¯
S(k) n S(k¡1)i
¯¯¯
=
³
n
k
´
¡
³
n¡1
k¡1
´
=
³
n¡1
k
´
.
Moreover, for all s 2 S(k¡1)i and s0 2 S(k) n S(k¡1)i , jN n sj = n ¡ k and
js0j = k. There are thus (n¡ k)
³
n¡1
k¡1
´
= (n¡1)!
(k¡1)!(n¡k¡1)! elements and k
³
n¡1
k
´
=
(n¡1)!
(k¡1)!(n¡k¡1)! elements respectively on the left-hand side term and on the
right-hand side term of ¢
(k)
i (m) that is, an identical number of elements for
each sum. We then group these terms two by two in the following way. Let
s 2 S(k¡1)i and j 2 N n s. We can write s = fi1 = i; i2; : : : ; ikg. Let s0 be
obtained from s by replacing i with j; that is, s0 = fi1 = j; i2; : : : ; ikg. By
construction s\s0 = fi2; : : : ; ikg implying thatM¡Ms0 =M¡Ms¡mi+mj .
Therefore,
¢
(k)
i (m) =
X
s2S(k¡1)i
X
j2Nns
mj
M
·
u0i
µ
mi
Ms
M
¶
¡ u0i
µ
wi ¡miM ¡Ms ¡mi +mj
M
¶¸
For all s 2 S and j 2 N n s, let bii (s;m) = mi (Ms=M) and bij (s;m) =
wi ¡mi (M ¡Ms ¡mi +mj) =M . Then,
@Eui
@mi
=
µ
1¡ mi
M
¶ nX
k=1
pk
X
s2S(k¡1)i
X
j2Nns
mj
M
[u0i (bii (s;m))¡ u0i (bij (s;m))]
(1)
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In particular, when m = w = (w1; : : : ; wn), and letting W =
P
i2N wi and,
for all s 2 S, Ws =W ¡Pi2swi (the remaining wealth after ¯rms in s have
burnt) we get:
@Eui
@mi
¯¯¯¯
¯
m=w
=
µ
1¡ wi
W
¶ nX
k=1
pk
X
s2S(k¡1)i
X
j2Nns
wj
W
·
u0i
µ
wi
Ws
W
¶
¡ u0i
µ
wi
Ws ¡ wi + wj
W
¶¸
(2)
Suppose that for some i; j 2 N , wi 6= wj. Then clearly wn > w1, implying
that @Eu1
@m1
¯¯¯
m=w
< 0 and @Eun
@mn
¯¯¯
m=w
> 0. In words, the poorest (resp. the
richest) household has strict incentives to underreport (resp. overreport) and
w = (w1; : : : ; wn) is not a Nash equilibrium of the La Crema game. If on the
contrary w1 = wn = w then for all i 2 N , wi = w and @Eui@mi
¯¯¯
m=w
= 0 implying
that w = (w1; : : : ; wn) is a Nash equilibrium of the La Crema game.
Proof of Remark 1: We proceed in ¯ve steps.
1. Let us show ¯rst that (m1;m2) with mi 6= 0 and mi 6= 2C for all
i 2 f1; 2g cannot be an equilibrium. Ifm0 = (m1;m2) were an equilibria
we would have:8<:
@Eu1
@m1
¯¯¯
m=m0
= 0
@Eu2
@m2
¯¯¯
m=m0
= 0
,
(
m1m2
m1+m2
= w1 ¡ m1m2m1+m2
m1m2
m1+m2
= w2 ¡ m1m2m1+m2
,
(
w1 = 2
m1m2
m1+m2
w2 = 2
m1m2
m1+m2
which is impossible.
2. The pro¯le (m01; 0), with m
0
1 6= 0; cannot be an equilibrium as
@Eu2
@m2
¯¯¯¯
¯
m=(m01;0)
= p1[u
0
2 (0)¡ u02 (w2)] > 0:
Similarly, (0;m02), with m
0
2 6= 0; cannot be an equilibrium.
3. The pro¯le (2C;m2) is not a Nash equilibrium. To see this, notice that
the best response to 2C is m
0
2 =
2w2C
4C¡w2 ; since
@Eu2
@m2
¯¯¯
m= (2C;m02)
= 0;
and m2 = 0; m2 = 2C produce lower payo®s than m
0
2 against 2C.
However, the best response to 2w2C
4C¡w2 is not 2C, but rather m1 =
(w1
2w2C
4C¡w2 )=(
4w2C
4C¡w2 ¡ w1) (which by assumption is smaller than 2C, as
one can directly verify that this expression is less than 2C whenever
w1 < w2).
4. The pro¯le ( 2w1C
4C¡w1 ; 2C), is a Nash equilibrium. First, the unique best
response to 2C is m01 =
2w1C
4C¡w1 : This also implies that (
2w1C
4C¡w1 ; 2C); with
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m1 6= 2w1C4C¡w1 is not an equilibrium. Then notice that the only point m02
at which @Eu2
@m2
¯¯¯
m= (m01;m
0
2)
= 0 is m02 = (w2
2w1C
4C¡w1 )=(
4w1C
4C¡w1 ¡w2), and by
assumption m02 < 0 (noting that the denominator is less than 0 if and
only if w1
³
1 + w2
4C
´
< w2). Also,
@Eu2
@m2
¯¯¯
m= (m01;0)
= p1[u
0
2 (0)¡u02 (w2)] >
0; which added to the fact that m02 < 0 and continuity implies that
@Eu2
@m2
¯¯¯
m= (m01;C)
> 0:
5. The only remaining case is m = (0; 0). This is trivially an equilibrium.
The payo® to any player i in this case is that of autarky, independently
of the choice of mi.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let a consumption vector c 2 IR2n,MRSr;si (c) =
pr@ui=@cr
ps@ui=@cs
denotes the marginal rate of substitution of player i 2 N between
two states r; s 2 S with respective probabilities pr and ps. Pareto e±cient
allocation are characterized by equal marginal rates of substitution across all
agents in N for all states in S. In particular, given a message vector m 2
[0; 2C]n and r; s 2 S(1)n
n
S
(0)
i [ S(0)j
o
, MRSr;si (c (m)) = MRS
r;s
j (c (m)) is
equivalent to
u0i
³
wi ¡mi M¡MrM
´
u0i
³
wi ¡miM¡MsM
´ = u0j
³
wj ¡mj M¡MrM
´
u0j
³
wj ¡mj M¡MsM
´ :
With identical CRRA utility functions we get
wi ¡miM¡MrM
wi ¡miM¡MsM
=
wj ¡mj M¡MrM
wj ¡mj M¡MsM
, (Ms ¡Mr) (miwj ¡mjwi) = 0:
Therefore, either there exists some ¸ 2 IR such that mk = ¸wk, 8k 2 N ,
or mk = ml = m, 8k; l 2 N . Now, let s = S(0)i and r 2 S(1)n
n
S
(0)
i [ S(0)j
o
.
Then, MRSr;si (c (m)) =MRS
r;s
j (c (m)) is equivalent to
wi ¡miM¡MrM
mi ¡mi miM
=
wj ¡mj M¡MrM
wj ¡mj miM
:
If mk = m, 8k 2 N this expression is equivalent to (wj ¡ mn )=(m ¡ mn ) = 1,8i; j 2 N which is incompatible with wi 6= wj for some i; j 2 N . We are
thus left with mk = ¸wk, 8k 2 N for some ¸ 2 IR. let s 2 S(0)i and r 2 S(0).
Then, MRSr;si (c (m)) =MRS
r;s
j (c (m)) is equivalent to
mi ¡mi miM
wi
=
wj ¡mj miM
wj
, ¸ = 1:
Moreover, it is easy to check that all other marginal rates of substitution are
equalized across agents when mi = wi, 8i 2 N .
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Proof of Remark 2: Let the Walrasian price for a unit of consumption
in state s be qs. The e±cient allocation of La Crema leads to consumption
of wi
Ws
W
for agent i in state s. Assume, for a contradiction, that the e±cient
allocation is a Walrasian equilibrium. The budget constraint is given by:
X
s2S
qs
wiWs
W
=
X
s=2Si
qswi
and dividing on both sides of the equation by wi, we obtainX
s2S
qs
Ws
W
=
X
s=2Si
qs (3)
Optimality requires that the marginal relation of substitution between
any two states r; s is equal to the ratio of consumption prices between these
states. Let us normalize the price of consumption in the state where no farm
burn (r = f0g) to 1. This implies that
psu
0
i
³
wi
wS
w
´
p0u0i(wi)
=
ps
³
wi
Ws
W
´®¡1
p0w
®¡1
i
=
ps
pf0g
µ
Ws
W
¶®¡1
= qs
substituting the price in (3) it follows that for each i:
X
s2S
ps
p0
µ
Ws
W
¶®
=
X
s=2Si
ps
p0
µ
Ws
W
¶®¡1
Eliminating the p0 we have
X
s2S
ps
µ
Ws
W
¶®
=
X
s=2Si
ps
µ
Ws
W
¶®¡1
Let S¡i denote the states that would exist if i were not in the economy. So,
S has twice as many states as S¡i. For s0 2 S¡i, let Ws0 be the wealth in
state s0 if i were not in the economy. Keep W as the total wealth including i
and p as the probability that a farm burns. We rewrite the above expression
as X
s02S¡i
ps0
"
(1¡ p)
µ
Ws0 + wi
W
¶®
+ p
µ
Ws0
W
¶®#
=
X
s02S¡i
ps0(1¡ p)
µ
Ws0 + wi
W
¶®¡1
Rearranging terms we get that
X
s02S¡i
ps0
"
(1¡ p)
µ
Ws0 + wi
W
¶® Ã
1¡
µ
Ws0 + wi
W
¶¡1!
+ p
µ
Ws0
W
¶®#
= 0 (4)
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must hold for each i. Now, let S¡j;k denote the set of states where neither j
nor k are in the economy. Rewriting (4) when i = j we get that
X
s002S¡j;k
ps00
"
(1¡ p)2
µ
Ws00 + wj + wk
W
¶® Ã
1¡
µ
Ws00 + wj + wk
W
¶¡1!
+(1¡ p)p
µ
Ws00 + wj
W
¶® Ã
1¡
µ
Ws00 + wj
W
¶¡1!
+p(1¡ p)
µ
Ws00 + wk
W
¶®
+ p2
µ
Ws00
W
¶®#
= 0 (5)
Similarly, from k's perspective we get
X
s002S¡j;k
ps00
"
(1¡ p)2
µ
Ws00 + wj + wk
W
¶® Ã
1¡
µ
Ws00 + wj + wk
W
¶¡1!
+(1¡ p)p
µ
Ws00 + wk
W
¶® Ã
1¡
µ
Ws00 + wk
W
¶¡1!
+p(1¡ p)
µ
Ws00 + wj
W
¶®
+ p2
µ
Ws00
W
¶®#
= 0 (6)
Subtracting (6) from (5) we get
X
s002S¡j;k
ps00(1¡ p)p
"µ
Ws00 + wk
W
¶®¡1
¡
µ
Ws00 + wj
W
¶®¡1#
= 0
But this cannot hold if wk < wj or if wk > wj , which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3: Let us ¯rst consider n ¸ 3. Given a message
vector m 2 [0; 2C]n and r 2 S(1)n
n
S
(0)
i [ S(0)j
o
; s 2 S(0), MRSr;si (c (m)) =
MRSr;sj (c (m)) is equivalent with identical CARA utility functions to
wi ¡miM ¡Mr
M
¡ wi = wj ¡mjM ¡Mr
M
¡ wj , mi = mj
Now, let r 2 S(0)i ; s 2 S(0): Then MRSr;si (c (m)) =MRSr;sj (c (m)) is equiv-
alent to
mi ¡mimi
M
¡ wi = wj ¡mjmi
M
¡ wj
Since mi = mj, this is equivalent to
mi ¡mimi
M
¡ wi = ¡mimi
M
, mi = wi
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Similarly we can also show that mj = wj , which is a contradiction
with mi = mj and wi 6= wj: Now let n = 2: Then, for r 2 S(0)1 ; s 2
S(0);MRS1;01 (c (m)) =MRS
1;0
2 (c (m)) is equivalent to
m1 ¡m1 m1
m1 +m2
¡ w1 = ¡m1 m2
m1 +m2
, w1 = m1 m2
m1 +m2
Similarly we can show that w2 = m2
m1
m1+m2
, which is a contradiction with
w1 6= w2.
Proof of Remark 3: Let a message vector m 2 [0; 2C]n and r; s 2
S(1)n
n
S
(0)
i [ S(0)j
o
,MRSr;s1 (c (m)) =MRS
r;s
i (c (m)) is equivalent with CRRA
utility functions to
1 =
wi ¡mi M¡MrM
wi ¡miM¡MsM
,Mr =Ms
Now, let s 2 S(0)i ; r 2 S(1)n
n
S
(0)
i [ S(0)j
o
: ThenMRSs;r1 (c (m)) =MRS
s;r
i (c (m))
is
1 =
mi ¡mi miM
wi ¡mi msM
, wi = mi
The previous two equalities imply that
wi = wj
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4: Fix h. We bound @Eui(w)
@mi
by an expression that
is decreasing in nh.
From (2) we know that
@Eui
@mi
¯¯¯¯
¯
m=w
=
µ
1¡ wi
W
¶ nX
k=1
pk
X
s2S(k¡1)i
X
j2Nns
wj
W
·
u0i
µ
wi
Ws
W
¶
¡ u0i
µ
wi
Ws ¡ wi + wj
W
¶¸
This implies that¯¯¯¯
¯ @Eui@mi
¯¯¯¯
¯
m=w
¯¯¯¯
¯ < max
s2S(k¡1)i ;j =2s
¯¯¯¯
u0i
µ
wi
Ws
W
¶
¡ u0i
µ
wi
Ws ¡ wi + wj
W
¶¯¯¯¯
(7)
Note that ¯¯¯¯
wi
Ws
W
¡ wiWs ¡ wi + wj
W
¯¯¯¯
< C
C ¡ c
nhc
26
Then by (7) and (A1), for any ¹ > 0 we can ¯nd H¹ such that for any
h > H¹, ¯¯¯¯
¯ @Eui@mi
¯¯¯¯
¯
m=w
¯¯¯¯
¯ < ¹
for all i 2 Nh. Finally, given any " choose ¹ such that ¹ = "
2C
. Given the
strict concavity of ui, it follows that the maximal gain from a report of some
mi instead of wi is 2Cj@Eui=@mij < " for all i 2 Nh where h > H¹. This
establishes the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 6: Let ¾ be a non-degenerate Nash equilibrium of
the La Crema game. Consider i and a strategy pro¯le ¾¡i that does not place
probability 1 on all players j 6= i playing 0. From (1) we know that
@Eui(m)
@mi
=
µ
1¡ mi
M
¶ nX
k=1
pk
X
s2S(k¡1)i
X
j2Nns
mj
M
[u0i (bii (s;m))¡ u0i (bij (s;m))]
where bii and bij are as de¯ned in the proof of Proposition 1. Consider any
strategy pro¯le mi; ¾¡i.
@Eui (mi; ¾¡i)
@mi
=
Z 264µ1¡ mi
M
¶ nX
k=1
pk
X
s2S(k¡1)i
X
j2Nns
mj
M
[u0i (bii (s;m))¡ u0i (bij (s;m))]
375 d¾¡i(m¡i)
(8)
Note that we can reverse the order of integration with respect to m¡i and
derivation with respect to mi (i.e., di®erentiate inside the integral in get-
ting the above expression) because the function @Eui (mi; ¾¡i) =@mi of mi is
bounded on player i's strategy set [0; 2C] for all ¾¡i. Note that (8) implies
that any strategy with mi < wi=2 is weakly dominated. This follows from
noting that bii(s;m) < mi and bij(s;m) ¸ wi¡mi for any s and m¡i, and so
given the strict concavity of ui the expression is strictly positive regardless
of s and m¡i, provided that mi < wi=2.
Let (s¤;m¤) minimize u0i(bii(s
¤;m¤))¡ u0i(bij(s¤;m¤)) over the support of
mi; ¾¡i. (8) and the concavity of ui also imply that
@Eui (mi; ¾¡i)
@mi
¸
Z 264 µ1¡ mi
M
¶ nX
k=1
pk
X
s2S(k¡1)i
X
j2Nns
mj
M
[u0i(bii(s
¤;m¤))¡ u0i(bij(s¤;m¤))]
375d¾¡i(m¡i)
Thus,
@Eui (mi; ¾¡i)
@mi
¸
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[u0i(bii(s
¤;m¤))¡u0i(bij(s¤;m¤))]
Z µ
1¡ mi
M
¶ nX
k=1
pk
X
s2S(k¡1)i
X
j2Nns
mj
M
d¾¡i(m¡i)
(9)
Given that ¾¡i that does not place probability 1 on all players j 6= i playing
0, the integral on the right hand side of (9) is strictly positive. Then it follows
from (9) that 0 ¸ @Eui(mi; ¾¡i)=@mi implies that
0 ¸ u0i(bii(s¤;m¤))¡ u0i(bij(s¤;m¤))
Thus, given (A1), 0 ¸ @Eui(mi; ¾¡i)=@mi implies that bii(s¤;m¤)) ¸ bij(s¤;m¤),
which can be rewritten as
mi ¸ wi
1 +
mi¡m¤j
M¤
(10)
Noting that 1 ¸ mi¡m¤j
M¤ ¸ ¡1, it follows from (10) that if ¾¡i does not place
probability 1 on all players j 6= i playing 0, then a best reply by i must have
support only on mi ¸ wi=2. This then implies that if ¾ is a mixed strategy
equilibrium that does not place probability 1 on (0; : : : ; 0), it must be that the
support of each ¾j is a subset of [wj=2; 2C]. This implies that
4C
W
¸ mi¡m¤j
M¤ ,
and so from (10) it follows that if ¾ is a mixed strategy equilibrium that does
not place probability 1 on (0; : : : ; 0), it must be that for each i and any mi
that is a best response to ¾¡i
mi ¸ wi=(1 + 4C
W
) (11)
Let (s¤¤;m¤¤) maximize u0i(bii(s
¤¤;m¤¤)) ¡ u0i(bij(s¤¤;m¤¤)) over the support
of mi; ¾¡i. If ¾¡i has the support of each ¾j as a subset of [wj=2; 2C] then
(8) and the concavity of ui imply that
[u0i(bii(s
¤¤;m¤¤))¡u0i(bij(s¤¤;m¤¤))]
Z µ
1¡ mi
M
¶ nX
k=1
pk
X
s2S(k¡1)i
X
j2Nns
mj
M
d¾¡i(m¡i)
¸ @Eui (mi; ¾¡i)
@mi
Thus, @Eui(mi; ¾¡i)=@mi ¸ 0 implies
wi
1 +
mi¡m¤¤j
M¤¤
¸ mi (12)
Since 4C
W
¸ mi¡m¤¤j
M¤¤ it follows that
wi=(1¡ 4C=W ) ¸ mi (13)
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(11) and (13) establish the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5: The fact that any pure strategy non-degenerate
equilibrium only involves play of mi ¸ w=2 such that 4C2W ¸ jmi¡wij follows
directly from the proof of Proposition 6. Let us show that there exists such
an equilibrium and that it is a strict equilibrium. We do this by showing
that to any best response of m¡i such that mj 2 [wj=2; 2C] there is a unique
best response (which then must be in [wi=2; 2C] by Proposition 6) that varies
continuously in m¡i. The result then follows from Kakutani's Theorem.
From the proof of Proposition 6 it follows that @Eui(m)=@mi is con-
tinuous in mi and m¡i, and that @Eui(m)=@mi > 0 if mi < wi=2, and
@Eui(mi)=@mi < 0 ifmi >
wi
1¡ 4C
W
. Thus, there exists a pointmi 2 [wi=2; wi1¡4C
W
]
where @Eui(mi)=@mi = 0. We show that at any such point @
2Eui(m)=@m
2
i >
0. This implies that there are no local minima which in turn implies that
there is a unique such point. Direct calculation gives8>>><>>>:
@bii
@mi
=
³
1¡ mi
M
´ ³
Ms
M
´
@bij
@mi
= ¡ (M¡mi)
M
³
M¡Ms¡mi+mj
M
´
, 8j 6= i
@
@mi
h
mj
M
³
1¡ mi
M
´i
= ¡2mj
M2
³
1¡ mi
M
´
leading to
@2Eui(m)
@m2i
=
µ
1¡ mi
M
¶ nX
k=1
pk
X
s2S(k¡1)i
X
j2Nns
mj
M
u00i (bii)
µ
1¡ mi
M
¶µ
Ms
M
¶
| {z }
<0
+
µ
1¡ mi
M
¶ nX
k=1
pk
X
s2S(k¡1)i
X
j2Nns
mj
M
u00i (bij)
µ
M ¡mi
M
¶µ
M ¡Ms ¡mi +mj
M
¶
| {z }
<0
¡
µ
1¡ mi
M
¶ nX
k=1
pk
X
s2S(k¡1)i
X
j2Nns
2mj
M2
[ u0i (bii)¡ u0i (bij)]
This second expression is ¡ 2
M
@Eui(m)=@mi and so the whole expression is
negative whenever @Eui(m)=@mi ¸ 0. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7: We prove (i), as then (ii) follows in a straight-
forward way from Proposition 5 (and (A2)). Let W
h
= Eh[W hs ]. The Weak
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Law of Large Numbers26 implies that
Probh
24¯¯¯¯¯¯W hs ¡W hW h
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ ¸ "
35! 0 (14)
for any " > 0. It follows from (14), the continuity and bounds on ui that for
any " > 0 there exists H such that
Probh
24¯¯¯¯¯¯ui
Ã
wi
W hs
W h
!
¡ ui
0@wiW h
W h
1A¯¯¯¯¯¯ ¸ "
35 < " (15)
for all i 2 Nh and any h > H. Let xh Pareto dominate xw;h. Suppose to the
contrary of the Proposition that there exists ± > 0 such thatP
i2Nh Eui(xh)¡ Eui(xw;h)P
i2Nh Eui(x
w;h)
> ±
for in¯nitely many h. Let xh = (E[xh1 ]; : : : ; E[x
h
nh]) be the expected value of
xh. Then by the concavity of ui,P
i2Nh ui(xh)¡ Eui(xw;h)P
i2Nh Eui(x
w;h)
> ± (16)
for in¯nitely many h. Given (A2), it follows from (16) and the fact that
xh Pareto dominates xw;h that for each such h we can ¯nd some ° > 0 and
vector bxh such that Pi2Nh bxhi = Pi2Nh xhi and
ui(bxhi )¡ Eui(xw;hi ) > ° (17)
for all i 2 Nh. Then from (15) it follows that
ui(bxhi )¡ ui
0@wiW h
W h
1A > °
for all i 2 Nh, for in¯nitely many h. However, as both bxh and wi WhWh sum to
W
h
, this is a contradiction.
26We apply a version covering sequences of heterogeneous but independent random
variables (e.g., see Billingsley Theorem 6.2 in the 1979 edition). Note here that ¾h=Wh ! 0
where ¾h is the standard deviation of Whs . This follows since C
p
nhp(1¡ p) ¸ ¾h and
Wh ¸ nc.
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